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Gain-based damages for breach of contract are often viewed as 
anomalous, and lacking a clear rational basis. This article seeks to provide a 
theoretical basis for the requirement to disgorge profits gained through breach 
of contract.  By looking at the core contractual obligation, it can be seen that a 
contracting party has two ways in which they can fulfil their promises. They 
can pay damages where they fully compensate the other party, or they can 
perform. Where damages are inadequate, the contracting party must perform. 
Failure to perform in such circumstances should be prevented, and it is argued 
that disgorgement of profits is a suitable deterrent to such contract breakers. It 
is suggested that the law should act in this way to protect the facilitative 
institution of contract. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Not so long ago it would not have been contentious to suggest that gain-
based damages have secured a foothold in the law of contract. Following 
Attorney General v Blake,1 it seemed that there was plenty of scope for 
argument about when gain-based damages were appropriate, but little room 
for suggesting that they should never be available. Following the Court of 
Appeal’s decision in the WWF case,2 and Lord Scott’s speech to the Chancery 
Bar Association,3 it appears that the tide of opinion may be again turning 
against such damages. The thrust behind both of those criticisms was that the 
award in Blake is best interpreted as compensatory in nature; the defendant’s 
profits providing the measure of a loss that was difficult to measure. 
This article considers the various arguments that have aligned for and 
against the introduction of gain-based damages, and focuses on the area that 
∗ BA, BCL (Oxon). I would like to thank William Swadling of Brasenose College, 
Oxford, who supervised the original version of this article. All errors remain my own. 
Thanks are also due to Jeffrey Hackney and Laura Hoyano of Wadham College, who 
guided my first, faltering, steps into the world of law. 
1 Attorney General v Blake (Jonathon Cape Ltd Third Party) [2001] 1 AC 268. 
2 WWF-World Wide Fund for Nature (formerly World Wildlife Fund) v World 
Wrestling Federation Inc [2007] EWCA Civ 286. 
3 Published, with slight revisions, as Lord Scott “Damages” [2007] LMCLQ 465. 
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appears to trouble commentators on both sides of the divide: whether and 
when contract breaches should be deterred. This question is then examined 
from first principles, asking why contracts are ever enforceable. The way in 
which one defines the basic contractual obligation is then used to inform the 
discourse on deterrence. It is argued that this analysis identifies some breaches 
of contract that require deterrence, wherever the breach leaves the losing party 
without any of the benefit contracted for. 
 
TERMINOLOGY 
 
When considering the question whether a contract-breaker who thereby 
profits ought to give up that profit, it should be remembered that a number of 
different terms have been used to describe such an award. Sums awarded have 
variously been described as “an account of profits”,4 “restitutionary 
damages”,5 and “disgorgement damages.”6 Those who use the 
“disgorgement” tag tend to do so to differentiate between those awards which 
are based upon the movement of some value between claimant and defendant, 
which has to be given back (a restitutionary award), as opposed to gains made 
by the defendant from another source which the claimant wants to be given up 
(a disgorgement award). As the situation with which this article is concerned 
relates to the “giving up” of profit, I accordingly use the “disgorgement” tag. 
It has the additional benefits of perspicacity of meaning; it clearly 
differentiates between this area and that of unjust enrichment, where the term 
“restitutionary” is standard, and it better reflects the idea of “giving up” the 
profit. 
 
ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR OF DISGORGEMENT DAMAGES 
 
In this section I consider the arguments that have been put forward in 
favour of the availability of disgorgement damages.  
 
(a) “A Wrongdoer Shall Not Be Allowed to Profit from Her Own Wrong” 
 
The most basic reason given for requiring disgorgement of profits is that 
the defendant ought not to be able to commit a wrong and retain the benefits 
gained therefrom. Thus, in considering the Blake case, Lord Nicholls said that 
4 Used by Lord Nicholls in Blake, above n 1. 
5 PBH Birks An Introduction to the Law of Restitution (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1985); AS Burrows The Law of Restitution (London: Butterworths, 2nd edn, 2002). 
6 J Edelman Gain-Based Damages: Contract, Tort, Equity and Intellectual Property 
(Oxford: Hart, 2002); P Jaffey “Restitutionary Damages and Disgorgement” [2001] 
RLR 578. 
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“[t]he broad proposition that a wrongdoer should not be allowed to profit from 
his wrong has an obvious attraction.”7 As a reason for making disgorgement 
damages available, this statement lacks any firm grounding; it is nothing more 
than an assertion of a vague moral position. It completely fails to tell us what 
“wrongs” are to be included within the principle, and why the claimant should 
be the proper recipient of the defendant’s gain. Indeed, most authors accept 
that this proposition is over-broad, so limit their contention to the more 
limited idea that profits ought not to be retained in certain situations.  
 
(b) The Cynical Defendant 
 
Edelman regards deterrence as the reason why disgorgement damages 
ought to be available for breach of contract. One type of breach which needs 
to be deterred, in his view, is where the defendant has acted “deliberately and 
cynically.”8 Disgorgement damages are required, according to this rationale, 
because the compensatory measure allows the wrongdoer to calculate the 
extent of such damages in advance, so as to calculate whether she can make a 
greater profit than she would have to pay out. Any person who is willing to 
breach their duty to somebody else in order to make a profit for themselves is 
thus caught by the test. In Edelman’s view, then, all deliberate breaches of 
contract ought to give the claimant the choice whether to seek disgorgement 
of the defendant’s profits instead of compensation for her loss; all such 
breaches need to be deterred. 
The “cynical contract-breaker” test is also the one adopted by Birks9 in 
his article advocating the possibility of stripping such defendants of their 
profits. Despite the apparently broad question that he asks at the start of the 
article,10 however, Birks adds an important restraint on the availability of 
disgorgement damages (he calls them “restitutionary damages”), in that: 
 
“There should be no recourse to restitutionary damages – not even in 
the case of cynical breach for the sake of gain – unless on the 
particular facts compensatory damages are demonstrably an 
inadequate remedy…”11
7 Blake, above n 1, p 278. 
8 Edelman, above n 6, p 84. 
9 PBH Birks “Restitutionary damages for breach of contract: Snepp and the fusion of 
law and equity” [1987] LMCLQ 330. 
10 Birks asks, ibid, at 330: “Suppose someone sees that by breaking his contract he 
can make a substantial profit: then, calculating that his likely gains will far outweigh 
any loss for which he might have to compensate his victim, he cynically decides to 
throw his contract over. In that strong case … can the victim claim the contract 
breaker’s profits?” 
11 Ibid, at 342. 
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Birks thus limits the category of cases in which disgorgement damages 
ought to be available to those where compensation fails to adequately protect 
the claimant. He regards the move towards allowing disgorgement damages 
for breach of contract as necessary to avoid the abuse of other legal concepts 
which have been used to reach the same result. He points to two cases, British 
Motor Trade Association v Gilbert12 and Reid-Newfoundland Telegraph v 
Anglo-American Telegraph Co13 as demonstrating these “legal contortions” 
where the courts have given disgorgement damages, whilst denying that they 
are departing from the compensatory measure of damages.  
 
(c) Institutional Protection 
 
Another argument that can be advanced for allowing disgorgement 
damages is that deterrence is required in order to protect the facilitative 
institution of contract. The idea that legal institutions require protection by 
deterring wrongs that harm those institutions was put forward by Jackman,14 
and the theory is most clearly borne out by the availability of disgorgement 
damages for breach of fiduciary duty, as exemplified by Boardman v 
Phipps.15 The argument suggests that a legal institution may be undermined 
by conduct, even if it does not cause the individual claimant any harm. So, 
fiduciary relationships require that the fiduciary act solely for the benefit of 
the other party, and the fiduciary is not permitted to make a profit for herself. 
In Boardman v Phipps the solicitor acted on information gained in his role as 
fiduciary and, even though his actions were profitable for the beneficiary of 
the duty, he was obliged to disgorge his profits in order to maintain the 
institution of fiduciary relationships.  
Jackman is ambivalent as to whether the institutional protection argument 
ought to extend to breaches of contract. On the one hand he concedes that 
compensatory damages which put the claimant in the position she would have 
been in had the contract been performed can be seen to provide “sufficient 
institutional protection to maintain that degree of stability which is essential to 
any practice of promise-making.”16 On the other hand he considers that a 
deliberate profitable breach might provide sufficient moral opprobrium to 
require disgorgement damages, in order to protect the institution. Jackman’s 
tentative suggestion that the institution of contract could require protection in 
some circumstances appears similar to that of Birks; whilst he considers that 
12 [1951] 2 All ER 641. 
13 [1912] AC 555. 
14 I M Jackman “Restitution for Wrongs” [1989] CLJ 302. 
15 [1967] 2 AC 46. 
16 Jackman, above n 14, at 320. 
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compensation will normally be an adequate response, he recognises that in 
some situations harm to the institution will result if only that measure is 
applied, and so deterrence might be appropriate. 
 
(d) Personal rights require the same protection as property rights. 
 
Another argument exists, presented by Friedmann17 and Smith18 and 
supported by the Supreme Court of Israel,19 that contractual rights are to be 
seen as the equivalent of property rights, and that when one breaches one’s 
contract one is depriving the other party of a right in a similar way as if one 
had taken their bicycle. The essence of Smith’s argument is that: 
 
“If disgorgement is not allowed and the wrongdoing defendant 
is allowed to keep the gain, then in essence the court is allowing 
rights to be expropriated.”20
 
He regards this as being true in relation to both personal rights, including 
breach of contract, and property rights. It is essential, in Smith’s view, that 
both groups of right are treated in the same way because he considers there to 
be very little difference between them. He admits that personal rights are only 
rights against particular individuals, whilst proprietary rights are rights against 
an indefinite class of people, but regards this as the only difference. As such 
he denies that there are any relevant differences in the content of the rights.  
Friedmann’s arguments are similar to those of Smith, arguing that denial 
of performance amounts to the deprivation of an interest that “belonged” to 
that contractual party. His argument, however, is slightly different, in that he 
places less emphasis on the idea of expropriation of rights, but instead focuses 
on the extent of protection that they deserve. He claims that: 
 
“Limitation of a [claimant’s] remedy to damages tends to 
trivialize the importance of contractual obligations, 
undermining faith in their seriousness and confidence in each 
party’s ability to rely on full performance.”21
 
17 D Friedmann “Restitution of Benefits Obtained Through the Appropriation of 
Property or the Commission of a Wrong” (1980) 80 Colum L Rev 504. 
18 LD Smith “Disgorgement of the Profits of Breach of Contract: Property, Contract 
and “Efficient Breach”’ (1995) 24 Canadian Business LJ 121. 
19 Adras Building Material Ltd v Harlow & Jones Gmbh [1995] Restitution Law 
Review 235. 
20 Smith, above n 18, at 122-123. 
21 Friedmann, above n 17, at 515. 
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These arguments tend to place less emphasis on the deterrence of 
particular types of breaches of contract, and seek to deter all breaches, as they 
undermine the integrity of personal rights. 
 
ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE AVAILABILITY OF 
DISGORGEMENT DAMAGES 
 
Arguments against the availability of disgorgement damages appear to 
implicitly assume that breaches of contract need not be deterred. 
Compensatory damages, under these theories, are sufficient protection for 
contractual obligations.  
 
(a) Corrective Justice 
 
Weinrib centres his theory around the notion of corrective justice so that, 
for him, “[t]he parties do and suffer injustice only with respect to … loss.”22 
Where such losses arise compensatory damages address the loss, and thus 
address the injustice. There is nothing else with which the law should be 
concerned. Damages which focus upon the gain made by the defendant, as 
disgorgement damages do, fail to live up to Weinrib’s requirement of 
correlativity, in which the question of injustice is answered by focusing on the 
relationship between the parties. There is no sufficient link, in his view, 
between the particular claimant and the profit, which requires that it be paid 
over; for him the claimant has no interest in whether the defendant makes a 
gain, all that should concern the defendant is the correction of her loss. 
Weinrib says that: 
 
“The remedy consists of the restoration by the defendant (so far as the 
law can achieve it) of what rightly belongs to the [claimant], thereby 
undoing the injustice suffered by the [claimant].”23
 
The thing that “rightly belongs” to the claimant, in Weinrib’s argument, is 
the “performance to which the claimant was entitled.”24 The restoration is 
effected by the payment of damages based on the performance interest. 
Provided that corrective justice is thus satisfied, there appears to be no room 
in Weinrib’s theory for notions of deterrence. Deterrence, as far as it concerns 
itself more generally with protecting personal rights, preventing cynical 
22 EJ Weinrib “Restitutionary Damages as Corrective Justice” (2000) 1 Theoretical 
Inquiries in Law 1, at 11. 
23 EJ Weinrib “Punishment and Disgorgement as Contract Remedies” (2003) 78 
Chicago-Kent L Rev 55, at 61. 
24 Ibid, at 68. 
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breaches or protecting the law’s facilitative institution, is external to the 
relationship between the parties. Such external factors are anathema to 
Weinrib, who claims that the law should be entirely intelligible from within 
the context of the bilateral relationship between claimant and defendant. He 
does not deny that some deterrence may be desirable, but says that any action 
against these harmful breaches “must be located within criminal rather than 
private law.”25  
Weinrib’s position has been echoed in a speech by Lord Scott.26 His 
Lordship suggested that general deterrence has no place in private actions, and 
questions the use of civil courts to “pursue the protection of the rights of the 
public at large”27 or to punish defendants. 
 
(b) The Theory of Efficient Breach 
 
The arguments in favour of disgorgement damages discussed above are, in 
the eyes of some, directed at a problem that does not exist, in that they are 
aimed at preventing breaches of contract. For those who believe in the 
paramount importance of economic efficiency,28 there is no need to deter 
breaches of contract. They consider it beneficial for a party to leave a contract 
where she has a more profitable option elsewhere, bearing in mind that she 
will have to pay compensation to the other party. After all, the award of 
compensation to the claimant ought to place that party in the position she 
would have been in had the contract been performed, so she should have no 
complaint. If the defendant can make extra profit then everybody appears to 
be better off. A “cynical” breach, which Edelman sees as requiring deterrence, 
would not be a problem under such a scheme, indeed it is to be encouraged.29 
This theory requires a system of compensation that covers all losses to the 
claimant, as is made clear by Campbell and Harris: 
“If the damages system works in the sense that damages actually are 
adequate, the claimant should be indifferent whether the defendant 
pays damages or performs.”30
25 Ibid, at 86. 
26 Above, n 3. 
27 Ibid, at 472. 
28 R A Posner Economic Analysis of Law (New York:  Aspen, 6th  edn, 2003) p 119. 
29 Posner (ibid) does include one exception, where “a promisor breaks his promise 
merely to take advantage of the vulnerability of the promisee … we may as well 
throw the book at the promisor.” Such breaches are regarded as inefficient, and thus 
can be deterred. This does not undermine Posner’s major point that breaches, for 
whatever motive, should not be deterred if they are economically efficient. 
30 D Campbell and D Harris “In Defence of Breach: a Critique of Restitution and the 
Performance Interest” (2002) 22 Legal Studies 208 at 219. 
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They recognize, however, that compensation is not always adequate, 
especially where there are “idiosyncratic” losses depending upon the situation 
of the contracting parties. In such cases Campbell and Harris place a great 
deal of emphasis upon the ability of parties to tailor their agreement to 
provide the degree of protection that they consider themselves to need. As 
such, the default rules of contractual damages ought to depend upon what 
most commercial parties could be expected to want, to save transaction costs 
of contracting out of such background rules. They regard disgorgement 
damages as out of line with what commercial parties want, and a move to a 
position whereby performance is enforced, which is contrary to the flexibility 
that the current system engenders.  
The theory of efficient breach does not consider that there is any need to 
deter breaches. Indeed, breaches are defended as necessary to ensure 
economic efficiency. 
 
WHEN DO WE NEED TO DETER BREACH OF CONTRACT? 
 
The arguments above, for and against disgorgement damages, have 
fundamentally different conceptions of whether breaches of contract should 
ever be deterred. Those in favour of making disgorgement damages available 
appear to do so because they wish particular kinds of breach to be deterred. 
For those that argue against the availability of disgorgement damages, on the 
other hand, the idea of deterrence is anathema. This section is aimed at asking 
whether we should ever want to deter breach of contract and, if so, what 
marks out those breaches that need to be deterred. 
In order effectively to answer this question it is important to go back to 
the more basic question of what a contract entitles the contracting party to 
receive. Some authors have tried to deny that the choice of secondary 
obligations31 in contract is necessarily connected with the underlying 
obligation.32 Birks has argued, when discussing civil wrongs in general, that 
31 The term “secondary obligations” derives from Lord Diplock’s speech in Photo 
Production v Securicor Ltd [1980] AC 827, where the term was used to refer to those 
obligations that arise from a breach of contract. I am using the term in a slightly 
broader sense, to include any court order that can be obtained upon a breach or 
threatened breach. 
32 R Craswell “Contract Law, Default Rules, and the Philosophy of Promising”, 
(1989) 88 Michigan LR 489 does this explicitly, whilst Fuller and Purdue “The 
Reliance Interest in Contract Damages” (1936) 46 Yale LJ 373 do so implicitly, 
recognising the will theory as the basis of contract, but failing to see any relevance in 
this when it comes to remedies. 
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“civil wrongs … dictate no particular response”,33 but there is much force in 
Friedmann’s argument that “the very recognition of a legal right entails some 
consequences regarding the remedy.”34 Where a number of legal responses 
are possible, it would appear logical that the law should choose those 
responses that most accurately reflect the underlying obligation that has been 
broken. The remedies given upon the breach of a contractual right should 
reflect the content of the underlying contractual right. 
In English law, at least, it is irrefutable that upon the valid formation of a 
contract each party is bound by his promise contained therein. The promise is 
to perform; as Roskill LJ has said “[i]n principle contracts are made to be 
performed.”35 It is not true, however, that the law always treats the promise as 
creating an obligation to perform, and nothing else. The promise does bind the 
promisor, but the law only demands adherence to that promise to the extent of 
not disappointing the promisee’s expectations that are generated thereby. In 
the words of Fried: 
 
“Put simply, I am bound to do what I promised you I would do – or I 
am bound to put you in as good a position as if I had done so.”36
 
This approach is similar to the oft-quoted statement from Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, that “[t]he duty to keep a contract at common law means a prediction 
that you must pay damages if you do not keep it - and nothing else.”37  
It would be possible for the law to focus on performance, as it does in 
other legal systems. In such systems specific performance remedies are 
paramount, and all breaches are discouraged. This can be seen in the approach 
taken by the Supreme Court of Israel, which has held that the disgorgement of 
gains is a useful deterrent against breach, saying that it was important to shift 
the emphasis “from the loss resulting from breach to the breach itself.”38 This 
reflects the general rule in Israeli law that a party to a contract is entitled to 
specific performance, meaning that deterrence of all non-performance is 
needed. 
33 P B H Birks “The Concept of a Civil Wrong” in D Owen (ed) Philosophical 
Foundations of Tort Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995) p 34. 
34 D Friedmann “The Performance Interest in Contract Damages” (1995) 111 Law 
Quarterly Review  628 at 637. 
35 Cehave NV v Bremer Handelsgesellschaft GmbH (The Hansa Nord) [1976] 1 QB 
44, p 71. 
36 C Fried Contract as Promise (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University 
Press, 1981). 
37 OW Holmes “The Path of the Law” (1897) 10 Harvard L Rev 457 at 462. 
38 Adras, above n 19, S Levin J, p 241. 
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A legal system makes a choice, and that choice entails consequences for 
individual contractual promises. This is analogous with Fried’s explanation as 
to why promises themselves have binding effect: 
 
“To have force in a particular case promises must be assumed to have 
force generally. Once that general assumption is made, the effects we 
intentionally produce by a particular promise may be morally 
attributed to us.”39
 
So, once a system decides upon either the duty to “perform or pay” or the 
duty to “perform at all costs”, that duty will attach to any given contractual 
promise.  
English law follows Fried in accepting that the payment of a sum to put 
the other party in the position she would have been in, had the contract been 
performed, is sufficient to remedy the breach of contract. The proof for this 
lies in the acknowledged primacy of the expectation measure of damages: 
“the general principle regarding assessment of damages is that they are 
compensatory for loss or injury.”40 The House of Lords in Blake focused on 
compensation, before moving on to consider situations where the general 
principle is not applied. 
The “perform or pay” principle, above, was illustrated by quotations from 
Fried and Holmes. They are not the same. Fried stated that the obligation is to 
perform or to place the other party in the position she would have been in had 
the contract been performed. Holmes, however, said that the obligation to 
perform only extended to the requirement to pay damages if in breach; “[i]f 
you commit a contract, you are liable to pay a compensatory sum unless the 
promised event comes to pass.”41 Fried’s formulation shows that the law 
accepts that the performance interest has two ways of being fulfilled; the 
promisor may perform, or she may pay damages to put the other person in the 
same position as if she had performed. The ability to satisfy the law in the 
latter sense rests on the idea that the payment of damages would be a 
sufficient substitute for actual performance. It follows, therefore, that if the 
payment of damages would not put the other party in the position as if the 
contract had been performed, then the performance interest can only be 
fulfilled by actual performance. This is different from Holmes’ formulation, 
who casts the principle in terms of a free choice. The choice, for Fried, is 
restricted by the requirement that damages must be an adequate substitute for 
performance; if they are not, then the choice does not exist. Fried’s 
39 Fried, above n 36, at 12. 
40 Lord Nicholls in Blake, above n 1, at 278. 
41 Holmes, above n 37, at 462. The phraseology of ‘committing a contract’ is odd; it is 
used by Holmes as a contrast to the idea of committing a tort. 
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formulation does appear to reflect the position in English law. This is 
demonstrated by the availability of the remedies of injunctions and specific 
performance in those cases where the performance interest would be 
insufficiently protected by an award of monetary damages. Such cases usually 
arise when the performance at issue could not be obtained elsewhere on the 
open market, such as the sale of a particular piece of land. It is submitted that 
this is a recognition of the inadequacy of damages in such cases, and the need 
for the law to provide alternative secondary obligations to oblige the promisor 
to fulfil their promise.  
This leads us to the conclusion that non-performance of a contract does 
not always need to be deterred. The performance interest is only left 
unfulfilled in those few cases where monetary damages are not an adequate 
substitute for the claimant’s primary rights, and where specific performance is 
not possible. It is only in such situations that we would want deterrence, 
because the contract breaker is failing to live up to their core contractual 
obligations, as described above. 
It is the availability of specific performance and injunctions that tells us 
when the normal award of compensatory damages is insufficient to protect the 
performance interest. It is important to note, however, that deterrence after 
non-performance does not perform the same role as damages or specific 
performance. Those awards are given in order to ensure fulfilment of the core 
contractual obligation. It is the impossibility of living up to the performance 
interest, on the other hand, which gives us our reason for wanting to deter. 
The idea of deterrence is therefore to prevent such wrongful non-
performances occurring in future, whereas specific performance is used to 
ensure actual performance in the case at hand. 
It can be asked how this result, on the question of which breaches of 
contract need deterring, differs from the arguments concerning the availability 
of disgorgement damages considered above. It is broadly in line with 
Jackman’s concerns for the protection of facilitative institutions, but does not 
bite in all situations where the defendant makes a profit. Instead, 
disgorgement damages should only be available where the standard secondary 
obligations leave the institution insufficiently protected.  
On the other side of the equation, Campbell and Harris’s argument in 
defence of breach and the expectation interest relies on the generally 
applicable secondary obligations leaving the claimant “indifferent” to the fact 
of breach. Damages, or the possibility of specific performance, do sometimes 
leave the claimant with a genuine grievance in those situations where they 
leave her performance interest unfulfilled, and therefore she would not be 
“indifferent” to the breach. Where the claimant is left with such a grievance, it 
is submitted that deterrence is needed and that the economic efficiency 
arguments lose their force. 
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Those who wish to deter all breaches, or that don’t think any breaches 
need deterring, do not fit in with the line taken here. It has been argued that 
they fail to take into account the approach towards the performance interest 
taken by English law, reflected by the secondary obligations that are imposed 
upon breach.  
In particular, the argument that personal rights should be treated in a 
similar way to property rights is not in line with English law. They posit a 
merely quantitative difference between personal rights and property rights, in 
terms of the number of people against whom they are exigible.42 The 
difference is more important than this, the difference between personal rights 
and property rights being that “the former goes to an object, the latter to an 
action.”43  In other words, the difference between property rights and personal 
rights is not merely quantitative, it is qualitative.  It can be seen that whilst the 
expropriation of property rights is conceptually simple, the idea of 
expropriating personal rights makes no sense.  If I contract with you to paint 
your house, and fail to do so, I have broken my promise to you, but I cannot 
be said to have taken your right, to have your house painted, for myself. 
The question of the cynicism of the defendant has not yet been addressed. 
It is clear from the above analysis that this test cannot form the basis of the 
availability of disgorgement damages, which is related to deterrence in order 
to protect the institution of contract law. The motive for breach could, 
however, enter into the picture as a limiting factor, so that innocent contract-
breakers are not bound to disgorge their profits. This proposition must be 
rejected. The idea that the mental element should additionally have to be 
proved adds complication to the law, and could undermine the goal of 
deterrence. The law should be aimed at preventing claimants’ performance 
interests from being left unfulfilled, and the defendant’s mental state does not 
affect that issue. Deterrence is focused on deterring future similar breaches, 
and the motive of the defendant in the particular case is therefore irrelevant. 
The same approach is taken in cases where fiduciaries are made to account for 
their profits, despite their innocence;44 the law acts to deter similar breaches 
in future, which would undermine the law’s institutions.  
The analysis above has been aimed at fleshing out the conception that 
deterrence is only needed where damages are insufficient. This is idea is used 
by Birks,45 and is reflected in the Blake judgement, considered below, but is 
often stated as a limiting factor on disgorgement damages without any reasons 
for setting the limit at that point. Instead of viewing the requirement of the 
42 E J Weinrib “Punishment and Disgorgement as Contract Remedies” (2003) 78 
Chicago-Kent L Rev 55. 
43 Ibid, at 81. 
44 Keech v Sandford (1726) All ER Rep 230; Boardman v Phipps [1967] 2 AC 46. 
45 Above n 5. 
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insufficiency of compensation as a limiting factor on disgorgement damages, 
it has been argued that the insufficiency in fact provides a basis for 
disgorgement damages.  
 
DISGORGEMENT DAMAGES AS DETERRENT 
 
The requirement to pay disgorgement damages has a deterrent effect that 
is precisely equal to the incentives that the contract-breaker had for breaking 
her promise. Any contractor, who acknowledges in advance that their breach 
of contract is going to undermine the promisee’s performance interest, ought 
to recognise that there is no good reason to breach. 
The case of Lake v Bayliss46 involved a contract for the sale of land but, 
prior to conveyance, the vendor sold the land again to a third party, for a 
profit.  The case was decided on trust principles, but it is submitted that this is 
precisely the kind of case where the breach of a contract does need to be 
deterred, even if the defendant were willing to pay damages.  The law 
recognises the uniqueness of contracts for the sale of land, and would usually 
provide for specific performance; damages are recognised not to be a fully 
adequate substitute. Therefore, by selling the land a second time the vendor 
prevented the original purchaser from receiving performance. The availability 
of disgorgement damages should make a landowner, considering whether to 
sell their land twice, see that there is no advantage to be gained by such 
action.   
Admittedly, the equivalence of deterrence to incentive does not provide 
reasons why punitive damages ought not be used. It could be expected that 
when faced with the possibility of even greater damages the chances of 
wrongful breaches would be reduced. Disgorgement damages could thus be 
seen as an insufficient deterrent; Lord Diplock, when referring to the 
legitimacy of punitive damages in tort law, pursues this argument: 
 
“It is only if there is a prospect that the damages may exceed the 
defendant’s gain that the social purpose … is achieved – to teach a 
wrong-doer that tort does not pay.”47
 
There are a number of problems with a proposal to extend punitive 
damages to the law of contract. Firstly, there is much controversy about the 
existence of punitive damages in the law as it stands, which does not make 
such awards available for breach of contract,48 and so the idea of extending 
46 [1974] 1 WLR 1073. 
47 Broome v Cassell & Co [1972] AC 1027 at 1130. 
48 Although a profitable breach of contract could appear to fall within Lord Devlin’s 
second category in Rookes v Barnard [1964] AC 1129 where “exemplary” damages 
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their availability is problematic. It is notable that the Law Commission, whilst 
advocating the extension of punitive damages, specifically limits such 
extension to “any tort or equitable wrong”49 and excludes breach of 
contract,50 whilst leaving to the courts the possibility of disgorgement 
damages for breach of contract.51  
A second argument against using punitive damages is the fact that, as 
considered above, the availability of disgorgement damages is closely attuned 
to the incentive which the defendant had to breach in the first place. To strip 
her of those profits is therefore necessary in order for the damages to have a 
deterrent function. A measure of damages that goes further than that, 
however, is disproportionate in requiring the defendant to pay more than is 
necessary to secure deterrence.  
 
WHY GIVE A “WINDFALL” TO THE CLAIMANT? 
 
The argument that deterrence is needed in a particular case focuses on the 
proposition that in such cases compensatory damages are insufficient to 
represent the lost performance. This would normally mean that specific 
performance would be granted, but where that is not possible then the breach 
must be deterred. However, the recognition that disgorgement damages could 
act as a deterrent against such breaches means that the size of the monetary 
award to the claimant appears to lose all anchorage to the size of loss.  
It is understandable that some might strive to prove the presence of loss in 
all circumstances, as our understanding of what it is to be a “victim” requires 
harm. In addition, most would accept the warnings of Mill, that “the only 
purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a 
civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.”52 This 
concern is reflected in the statement by Glidewell LJ in Halifax Building 
Society v Thomas, where he said: 
 
may be awarded (where the “defendant's conduct has been calculated by him to make 
a profit for himself which may well exceed the compensation payable to the plaintiff’) 
Lord Devlin only refers to teaching “a wrongdoer that tort does not pay”. All 
invocations of the second category restrict it to tort claims, as in the quotation from 
Lord Diplock, above. In AB v South West Water [1993] QB 507 the test was explicitly 
said not to apply to breaches of contract, though the case was later overruled (not on 
this point) in Kuddus v Chief Constable of Leicestershire [2002] 2 AC 122. 
49 Law Commission of England and Wales Aggravated, Exemplary and Restitutionary 
Damages (Law Com No 247, 1997) para 5.44.  
50 Ibid, para 5.71. 
51 Ibid, para 3.47. 
52 J S Mill Utilitarianism, Liberty, Representative Government (London: Everyman 
Editions, 1910). 
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“The proposition that a wrongdoer should not be allowed to profit 
from his wrongs has an obvious attraction. The further proposition, 
that the victim or intended victim of the wrongdoing, who has in the 
event suffered no loss, is entitled to retain or recover the amount of the 
profit is less obviously persuasive.”53
 
Even conceding that the claimant could receive more than any 
conceivable value of the lost performance, the payment of disgorgement 
damages may still be explained on the basis that “overcompensating the 
claimant is a lesser evil than leaving the defendant with ill-gotten gains.”54 
Another way of defending the claimant’s receipt is that we need to give the 
claimant an incentive to bring these cases to court, in order that the defendant 
may be stripped of her profit, so that future cases may be deterred. If the 
claimant could only receive money for provable losses then there may be no 
point in suing the contract-breaker. As McInnes has noted “the prospect of a 
windfall gain motivates him to sue.”55  
Persuading the Claimant to sue is important if we take deterrence of future 
actions seriously. It is conceded that the value of disgorgement damages is not 
in any way tied to the claimant’s loss, but appeals to the greater need to 
protect the institution of contract, and those future contractors who would 
otherwise be left with no performance.  
That the law acts through private litigation in order to protect its 
facilitative institutions in other contexts is demonstrated by the cases of Keech 
v Sandford56 and Boardman v Phipps.57 A fiduciary can be made to account 
for all profits, in order to protect the equitable institution, even if no 
opprobrium is attached to the fiduciary’s actions. As was said in 1726: 
 
“It may seem hard that the trustee is the only person of all mankind 
who might not have the lease, but it is very proper that rules should be 
strictly pursued, and not in the least relaxed; for it is very obvious 
what would be the consequence of letting trustees have the lease on 
refusal to renew to cestui que use.”58
 
This example undermines the arguments of those that suggest that private 
law should have no interest in issues that are external to the two parties in 
litigation. There are many other examples where the courts covertly take 
53 [1996] Ch 217, p 229. 
54 A S Burrows The Law of Restitution (London: Butterworths, 2nd edn, 2002) p 480. 
55 M McInnes “Interceptive Subtraction, Unjust Enrichment and Wrongs—A Reply to 
Professor Birks” [2003] Cambridge Law Journal 697 at 706. 
56 (1726) All ER Rep 230. 
57 [1967] 2 AC 46. 
58 Above n 56. 
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broader social considerations into account, but the defence of fiduciary duties 
is one area where the law is happy to acknowledge the influence of questions 
such as deterrence. 
 
WHERE DOES ENGLISH LAW STAND? 
 
Having established a basis upon which the availability of disgorgement 
damages can be justified, it is necessary to see whether this approach is 
consistent with the case-law.  
 
(a) The Law Prior to Blake 
 
It is possible to find many statements in the cases prior to Blake to the 
effect that the purpose of damages is only to compensate for loss.59 However, 
as Birks has pointed out, there are a number of cases where the defendant’s 
gain formed the basis for the calculation of the damages payable. He identifies 
such cases as awarding disgorgement damages (which he calls 
“restitutionary”), but disguising them as compensatory only through 
“intellectual contortions.”60  
The first case is Reid-Newfoundland Co v Anglo-American Telegraph 
Co,61 where the appellants, telegraph wire operators, took a lease subject to a 
contractual term that obliged them not to use the wire for the transmission of 
commercial messages. In fact, they did so use the wire and the Privy Council 
held that they were liable to account to the respondents for the profits made, 
stating that the defendants held the profits as constructive trustees. As Birks 
points out, the trust language of the case was purely instrumental, and ought 
to have been considered without resorting to such result-based reasoning. The 
respondents would clearly have been entitled to an injunction to prevent the 
appellants from misusing the wire. Disgorgement damages in the case can be 
seen as a recognition that there was no way in which damages could be 
calculated so as to accurately reflect the performance to which the 
respondents were entitled. This is the kind of breach that needs to be deterred, 
and so the use of disgorgement damages can be seen as entirely proper. On 
the other hand, the legal tools available to calculate damages have developed 
since 1912, and a modern court might see a Wrotham Park award as an 
appropriate way to calculate the claimant’s loss in such a case. 
The next case is that of British Motor Trade Association v Gilbert,62 
where the claimant had sold a car to the defendant, the contract prohibiting 
59 See, for example, Tito v Waddell (No. 2) [1977] Ch 106, p 332 (Megarry VC). 
60 Birks, above n 9, at 430. 
61 [1912] AC 555. 
62 [1951] 2 All ER 641. 
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resale within two years unless the BMTA were first given the option of 
repurchasing the car at the original list price. This was in order to defeat the 
post-war black market in cars. The defendant then sold the car on the black 
market, for a substantial profit over the list price, and the claimant sought 
damages. Danckwerts J calculated the damages by reference to the market 
price that the defendant had obtained notwithstanding the absence of such an 
open market. Birks regards the case as one where an award of disgorgement 
damages would have avoided the contortions required to give the same sum 
on a compensatory basis. This case is yet another where there are clear 
problems in assessing the compensatory sum, due to the presence of a black 
market, and one where an injunction could have been obtained if requested 
early enough. The whole point of the contractual provision was to uphold a 
larger scheme in order to defeat the black market. A deterrent was needed in 
order to protect the BMTA’s scheme and this deterrent was served by the 
requirement to disgorge profits. Later purchasers of the car from the BMTA 
should have known that they had nothing to gain by breaking the contract. 
The final case referred to by Birks is one already mentioned, Lake v 
Bayliss,63 where there was an alleged contract for the sale of land, which the 
vendor then sold to somebody else for an increased price. On the hypothesis 
that the alleged contract was good, Walton J decided that the claimant was 
entitled to the money received from the second purchase by reason of a 
constructive trust. It is submitted that the same result could have been reached 
through the contract itself. It was one that was specifically enforceable, 
reflecting the law’s acknowledgement that particular pieces of land are 
unique, so that the promise could only be fulfilled by the conveyance of the 
land identified. It is therefore appropriate to deter those who would seek to 
refrain from performance by allowing a claim for disgorgement damages. 
Other cases which need to be considered are cases in which the monetary 
sum awarded to the claimants was based upon the price that could have been 
charged by the claimant for the relaxation of the broken covenant. The value 
of the award has not, in these cases, been calculated by reference to the 
covenant itself, or the loss to the claimant, but by reference to a percentage of 
the profit made by the defendant. The clearest case is that of Wrotham Park 
Estate Co v Parkside Homes,64 where the defendant breached a restrictive 
covenant not to build on land, thereby making a profit. Brightman J gave the 
claimants a sum equivalent to 5% of the defendant’s profit.  
We immediately run into the question whether these are properly to be 
seen as disgorgement damages, restitutionary damages or compensatory 
damages. Edelman regards them as restitutionary damages, seeing the award 
as reflecting the value of the right which moved between the claimant and the 
63 Above n 46. 
64 [1974] 1 WLR 798. 
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defendant. The value of that right was calculated by reference to the “sum of 
money as might reasonably have been demanded by the plaintiffs from [the 
defendant] as a quid pro quo for releasing the covenant.”65 It would, however, 
be possible to see the sum awarded as a rough-and-ready calculation of the 
claimant’s lost bargaining opportunity, and so the award could be seen as 
compensatory. This compensatory analysis was preferred by the Court of 
Appeal in Jaggard v Sawyer,66 but was rejected by the Court of Appeal in 
Surrey County Council v Bredero,67 where the Wrotham Park award was seen 
as based upon the defendant’s gain. In Blake Lord Nicholls considered 
Wrotham Park to be a “solitary beacon”68 demonstrating that damages are not 
tied to provable financial loss, and could be measured by reference to the 
defendant’s gain. The idea that damages are “measured” by reference to profit 
does not, however, mean that they are given because of the fact of profit. It 
has been said in a more recent case that: 
 
“It is natural to pay regard to any profit made by the wrongdoer 
(although a wrongdoer surely cannot always rely on avoiding having 
to make reasonable recompense by showing that despite his wrong he 
failed, perhaps simply due to his own incompetence, to make any 
profit).”69
 
This passage suggests that the sum awarded is attempting to be an 
objective measure of the loss to the claimant, and is not based on the profit to 
the defendant. So, even if profit had not been made the court would try to 
award the same sum for the claimant’s losses. The latest case to consider 
Wrotham Park damages also suggests that they are compensatory.70
These cases have centred around restrictive covenants, and these normally 
entitle the claimant to seek an injunction. In fact, an injunction is precisely 
what the claimants were seeking in Wrotham Park itself; Bingham J held that 
he could not grant one, however, as it would be an “be an unpardonable waste 
of much needed houses to direct that they now be pulled down.”71 The 
availability of injunctions was one factor, above, which led to the conclusion 
that some breaches of contract need to be deterred. It can be asked, therefore, 
65 Ibid, at 815. 
66 [1995] 1 WLR 269. 
67 [1993] 1 WLR 1361. 
68 Blake, above n 1, at 283. 
69 Experience Hendrix v PPX Enterprises [2003] EWCA Civ 323, per Mance LJ at 
para [26]. 
70 WWF-World Wide Fund for Nature (formerly World Wildlife Fund) v World 
Wrestling Federation Entertainment Inc [2007] EWCA Civ 286, though the logic of 
this case is doubted below. 
71 Above n 64, at 811. 
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why Bingham J did not deter future breaches of restrictive covenants by 
awarding full disgorgement damages. The answer may be that the presence of 
injunctions is generally sufficient to protect both the individual claimants and 
the institution of restrictive covenants. The fact that disgorgement damages 
were not given should not encourage future defendants from thinking that 
they can ignore the covenants, as claimants already have a powerful weapon 
to prevent that from happening. 
Another distinguishing factor between these cases and full disgorgement 
may be the wider view taken of the defendants’ conduct; they did breach their 
contract, but they did not undermine a wider scheme.  In the BMTA case 
above, and Blake, the breaches of contract destroyed the integrity of wider 
contractual schemes set up by the claimants. Whilst many claimants who 
benefit from a restrictive covenant would be willing to relax it for a fee, the 
government would never let a spy betray confidences and then write about his 
actions for any amount of money.  
As we have seen with the cases above, the courts do not always grant 
specific performance or injunctions, even where damages are insufficient to 
compensate the claimant. In Co-operative Insurance Society v Argyll Stores,72 
for example, the trial judge refused to require a supermarket to stay open, 
even though the defendant had contracted to do so. The supermarket was 
losing money, so it had been shut by its operator, without finding an assignee 
for the lease. Although the Court of Appeal thought that the order for specific 
performance should be awarded, the House of Lords unanimously held that it 
should not. Key to the reasoning was that such an order would be difficult to 
supervise, and would be oppressive to the defendants. It can be asked whether 
disgorgement should have been awarded in such a case. To the extent that the 
only obstacle to specific performance was practical, it seems that the 
defendant shouldn’t be allowed to ignore its contractual obligations, leaving 
the claimant without its performance interest. The court could have calculated 
how long it would have taken to find an assignee and awarded the losses 
avoided by the supermarket in that period.73
 
 (b) Attorney General v Blake 
 
The Reid-Newfoundland and BMTA cases described are only weak 
authority for deterrence-based analysis, as none consider themselves to be 
giving disgorgement damages for breach of contract. The awards were given 
either on trust principles or as compensation for breach of contract. Attorney 
72 [1998] AC 1. 
73 In fact, the supermarket did find an assignee prior to the case reaching the House of 
Lords. 
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General v Blake74 is different, however, in that it was the first time that the 
question of disgorgement damages for breach of contract had been confronted 
head-on.  
Upon escaping from prison the traitor George Blake fled to Moscow, and 
he later wrote an autobiography which included material he had obtained as a 
spy. Such actions amounted to a crime in England, under the Official Secrets 
Act 1989, but it was clear that a prosecution on that basis would never be 
possible. The Blake case arose because the British government had discovered 
that Blake’s publishers, Jonathon Cape, had agreed to pay large sums to him 
as advances of royalties and the government wished to prevent him from 
obtaining sums that had not yet been paid to him. Blake had signed a contract 
upon entering into the Secret Intelligence Services, which obliged him to seek 
approval before publishing any material relating to the intelligence service. As 
he had not received such approval he was clearly in breach of his contract. 
Their Lordships, therefore, had to answer the question as to what damages, if 
any, could be awarded for such a breach. Crucial to the case was the fact that 
the Crown was unable to prove any losses. The Crown was, however, 
awarded an account of profits. 
Much of Lord Nicholls’ leading speech (with whom Lords Goff, Browne-
Wilkinson and Steyn concurred) is directed at demonstrating that in other 
areas of the law compensation is not the only remedy that is available. This 
leads him to conclude that there is no logical reason why disgorgement 
damages ought not to be available for some breaches of contract. The award 
should, however, be given only in “exceptional circumstances” and, whilst 
deliberately not setting down fixed rules, Lord Nicholls stated that in future 
cases: 
 
“The court will have regard to all the circumstances, including the 
subject matter of the contract, the purpose of the contractual provision 
which has been breached, the circumstances in which the breach 
occurred, the consequences of the breach and the circumstances in 
which relief is being sought. A useful general guide, although not 
exhaustive, is whether the plaintiff had a legitimate interest in 
preventing the defendant's profit-making activity and, hence, in 
depriving him of his profit.”75
 
It is not at all clear what cases he envisages falling within this broad 
guideline, and it is thus hard to know whether the “legitimate interest” of 
which he speaks is equivalent to the approach taken in this article. Does it 
reflect an idea that compensatory damages would leave the claimant without 
74 Above n 1. 
75 Ibid, at 285. 
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the full equivalent of performance, and that specific performance cannot be 
granted?  
The inadequacy of the standard secondary obligations, a feature key to the 
analysis above does feature prominently in Lord Nicholls’ reasoning: 
 
“Normally the remedies of damages, specific performance and 
injunction, coupled with the characterisation of some contractual 
obligations as fiduciary, will provide an adequate response to a breach 
of contract. It will be only in exceptional cases, where those remedies 
are inadequate, that any question of accounting for profits will 
arise.”76
 
Lord Nicholls then says: 
 
“In the same way as a plaintiff's interest in performance of a contract 
may render it just and equitable for the court to make an order for 
specific performance or grant an injunction, so the plaintiff's interest 
in performance may make it just and equitable that the defendant 
should retain no benefit from his breach of contract.”77  
 
This appears to agree that the protection of the performance interest, as 
described above, will sometimes justify disgorgement damages. However, if 
his Lordship regards such damages as acting in the same way as specific 
performance, as suggested by this dictum, it parts company with the 
deterrence approach. It has been argued that disgorgement damages do not 
protect the performance interest, but work to deter future breaches. In other 
words, it has been argued that the goal of the court should not relate to the 
instant case of profit-making activity, but should relate to the prevention of 
future occurrences of such breaches. It is too late to protect the performance 
interest in the case before it, but the court can attempt to ensure that the 
performance is respected in future instances. It is respectfully submitted that 
this analysis is more appropriate because there is no apparent link between 
disgorgement damages and the performance interest, and Lord Nicholls does 
not provide one. 
Though their Lordships did not award an account of profits on the 
deterrent basis, the facts of the case clearly fit the approach. Damages based 
on the loss of the Crown’s performance interest would have been incapable of 
proper measurement (Blake “caused untold and immeasurable damage to the 
public interest”78) and it was far too late to issue an injunction to prevent him 
76 Ibid. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Ibid, at 286 (Lord Nicholls). 
DISGORGEMENT DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT 
108 
                                                     
from publishing the book. Disgorgement damages would have done little to 
improve the Crown’s performance interest in the case, but they can be 
expected to have done much to discourage future breaches of similar 
contracts. The potential contract-breaker should know she has nothing to gain 
and will not bother to write a book from which she cannot profit.  
 
(c) Post-Blake 
 
There have been a number of cases79 and one arbitration80 in which the 
courts have been asked to apply the Blake “legitimate interest” test so as to 
award disgorgement damages for breach of contract. Only in Esso v Niad was 
the court willing to accede to this request. That case concerned a petrol station 
that had agreed with Esso to sell Esso’s petrol at a price fixed by Esso, and for 
which the petrol station owners received price support. They breached this 
agreement, however, by accepting the price support but selling the petrol 
above the set price. Morritt VC considered the case to come within the 
guidance given by Lord Nicholls, as the breaches had been deliberate and had 
undermined the whole scheme that Esso had set up. In addition it was seen as 
relevant that it would be impossible to prove the extent of the losses sustained 
by Esso.81 So, this case seems to fit neatly into the pattern that ought to give 
rise to disgorgement damages. Damages were impossible to prove, and 
specific performance was no longer possible. Esso’s whole scheme depended 
upon individual petrol stations living up to their contractual obligations; it was 
thus important that they be able to deter future breaches of the type found in 
this case. 
The arbitration tribunal’s decision, the Sine Nomine, also fits the approach 
of this article, as it concerned the breach of contract by the withdrawal from 
service of a chartered vessel. The contract was a commercial one, and the 
arbitration tribunal was clear: 
 
“There should not be an award of wrongful profits where both parties 
are dealing with a marketable commodity – the services of a ship in 
this case – for which a substitute can be found in the market place.”82
 
In such situations damages would be an adequate substitute for the 
promised performance and so deterrence is not required. The tribunal’s 
79 Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Niad Ltd [2001] EWHC Ch 458; Experience Hendrix LLC 
v PPX Enterprises Inc [2003] EWCA Civ 323; WWF-World Wide Fund for Nature 
(formerly World Wildlife Fund) v World Wrestling Federation Entertainment Inc 
[2007] EWCA Civ 286. 
80 AB Corporation v CD Company ‘The Sine Nomine [2002] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 805. 
81 Esso v Niad, above n 79, at para [56]. 
82 Sine Nomine, above n 80, at para [10]. 
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decision also gives weight to one of the underlying notions of contractual 
promises, that the promise does not entitle a party to performance, within 
English law, where the equivalent of that performance can be provided by a 
monetary award. It is taken as granted by the tribunal that “[i]nternational 
commerce on a large scale is red in tooth and claw”,83 and the tribunal does 
not appear to see such deliberate breaches as something that need to be 
deterred. 
The Court of Appeal in Experience Hendrix84 rejected the claimant’s 
request for full disgorgement damages on the basis that there was no analogy 
between Blake’s Secret Intelligence Services contract and an agreement as to 
the retail rights for the songs of Jimi Hendrix. Instead the Court of Appeal 
granted an award of damages based on a reasonable sum that could have been 
obtained for the relaxation of the contract, on the Wrotham Park line of 
authority. It appears from the way in which the matter is approached that the 
court viewed Blake’s full disgorgement of damages as on a sliding scale with 
Wrotham Park damages, based on a proportion of the profits made. The 
question that tips the balance from one to the other is apparently the question 
of exceptionality. This idea of a sliding scale must be challenged. Wrotham 
Park damages are based on a right of the claimant’s which has not been 
respected, and represent payment for that infringement. Full disgorgement, 
however, rests upon the notion of deterrence, thus depending on a completely 
different rationale. The use of Wrotham Park damages in Experience Hendrix 
can, however, be seen as a decision that in the case such damages do represent 
the full performance interest.  
The final case to consider full disgorgement damages involved the use of 
the initials “WWF” by the World Wrestling Federation.85 Litigation dating 
back to 2001 had established a breach of contract by the Federation, and the 
claimant owners of the trademark had failed in a previous attempt to seek full 
disgorgement damages. Returning to the High Court in 2006 the Claimants 
sought Wrotham Park damages, and their claim was allowed to proceed. The 
Defendants appealed on the basis that any claim for Wrotham Park damages 
should have been brought at the same time as the earlier claim for full 
disgorgement damages. 
Chadwick LJ gave the judgment of the Court of Appeal, in which he 
asked whether the two types of damages have the same juridical basis, the 
Defendants saying that they are both gain-based. After analysing the Wrotham 
Park line of authority his Lordship held that they should be treated as 
83 Ibid, at para [9]. 
84 Experience Hendrix LLC v PPX Enterprises Inc [2003] EWCA Civ 323. 
85 WWF-World Wide Fund for Nature (formerly World Wildlife Fund) v World 
Wrestling Federation Entertainment Inc [2007] EWCA Civ 286. 
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compensatory.86 He did, however, find in favour of the Defendants, holding 
that the Blake award of an account of profits was also compensatory. He 
justified this on the basis that both awards become available where loss cannot 
be identified, so the courts make a “flexible response to the need to 
compensate the Claimant for the wrong which has been done to him.”87
In many ways Chadwick LJ’s analysis matches that of Lord Scott’s 
argument, considered above.88 Whereas Lord Scott accepts that his analysis 
contradicts Lord Nicholls,89 however, Chadwick LJ suggests that he is 
following the Blake case. Treating the Blake case as the application of 
compensatory principles does seem to fly in the face of much of Lord 
Nicholls’ language. His Lordship’s speech focuses on George Blake’s gain, 
not the Security Services’ loss, and there is no attempt to marry the loss to the 
award. Lord Scott, in opposing damages that are not compensatory, calls upon 
us to “call a spade a spade.”90 To call Blake “compensatory” fails to do so. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
It has been argued that the disgorgement damages can be seen as having a 
principled basis. This basis depends on the idea that the generally applicable 
secondary remedies, of damages backed-up by specific performance, are 
geared towards the protection of the promisee’s performance interest. In some 
situations, however, those awards fail to live up to the performance interest, 
and in such cases deterrence is required. Disgorgement damages are the way 
in which this deterrence is effected.  
It is far from clear that the solution laid out in this essay is the one 
operating on the minds of the judiciary when they award disgorgement 
damages. It is submitted, however, that the analysis used herein is in line with 
a proper understanding of the performance interest, which is engaged 
whenever a contract is formed with English law. Admittedly the law can 
change direction on such matters, but the Israeli solution which creates a near-
absolute obligation to perform has not been accepted in English law. At 
present a breach of contract generates the obligation to pay damages as an 
alternative to performance. Only where this monetary substitute fails to be an 
adequate substitute for performance, and only where performance itself is 
impossible to achieve, are disgorgement damages supportable. 
86 Ibid, at para [57]. 
87 Ibid, at para [59]. 
88 Above n 3. 
89 Ibid, at 468: “Lord Nicholls, while approving [the Wrotham Park] cases, regarded 
them as an exception to the general rule that damages should be compensatory. I 
respectfully disagree.” 
90 Ibid, at 469. 
